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UNITED STATES v. WADE:
THE PRE/POST INDICTMENT DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION
On June 20, 1967 the Supreme Court handed down the decision of United States v. Wade1 which guarantees to an accused
the right to be represented by counsel at a pre-trial line-up proceeding.
Because the court did not rule on when this right comes into
existence, some courts have held that the Wade decision applies
only to post-indictment line-ups 2 and others have applied Wade
without regard to whether or not there has been a formal indictment.8 The major purpose of this comment will be to examine the question of whether the right to counsel exists only after
an accused has been formally indicted, or whether counsel at
line-up proceedings is a requirement without regard to indictment.
A determination of the meaning and application of Wade
requires first a look at those cases dealing with the right to counsel decided prior to Wade. Those cases, especially Miranda v.
Arizona' and Escobedo v. Illinois,5 because they laid the groundwork for Wade, have had a strong impact on Wade's interpretation.
In reviewing the cases decided subsequent to Wade, which
indicate whether indictment is necessary to invoke the Wade
rule, most of the discussion will concern lower federal court
opinions. However, what appears to be the minority approach
of the Illinois Courts in the Wade area will also be reviewed.
Finally the effect of the Title II Omnibus Crime Control
Act," which apparently was designed to repeal or drastically
modify Wade and its progenyJ will be considered, although a
1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

2 People v. Palmer, 41 111. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969); State v.
Matlock, 49 N.J. 491, 321 A.2d 869 (1967); State v. Sicliair, 49 N.J. 525,
231 A.2d 565 (1967).
3 Palmer v.State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969).

4384

U.S. 436 (1966)

5378 U.S. 478 (1964).
6 Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C.A. §3500. Note this act applies to federal prosecutions and is not
binding on the States:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate
in the commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall
be admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial court
ordained and established under Article III of the Constitution of the
United States.
7Id.; United States Code Congressional and Administrative News at
2139. Comment was made that United States v. Wade "struck a harmful
blow at the nationwide effort to control crime" by limiting the use of eye-
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constitutional confrontation between this law and the Supreme
Court decisions has, as yet, not occurred.
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE WADE

Whether Wade applies only after indictment should depend
on the objectives and reasons for the decision. These in turn,
are best understood by a consideration of the right to counsel cases prior to Wade. An examination of these cases shows
that the scope of the right to counsel was increased over the years
to include in a number of what are called "critical stages" of the
criminal proceedings. The judicial atmosphere that evolved was
expressed in Powell v. Alabama,"where the court said,

....
even

the intelligent and educated layman... requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him."
Until the case of Gideon v. Wainwright ° in 1963, the sixth
amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions was not
binding on the states. 1 The states were using a "voluntariness
totality of circumstances" approach to protecting the rights
of an accused from abuses by police. This test was used primarily in determining whether to admit a confession.12 The
trial judge looked to "all the circumstances surrounding" a confession to determine if it was voluntary. If so the confession
was admissible. However, it was extended into the area of police
line-ups as well. 13 In the case of a line-up, the trial judge similarly looked to "all the circumstances surrounding" the line-up
proceeding to determine if it was fair and impartial. If so,
the line-up identification satisfied due process and was admissible.

4

However, the courts became convinced that the "totality of
circumstances" approach did not effectively protect an accused
from abuses by police.15 Such an approach left wide discretion
in the judge in determining the fairness of a confession or lineup, and because there were usually no witnesses to the pre-trial
witness testimony.

"To counter this harmful effect, the committee adopted

that portion of Title II that denies the Federal courts the power to review the

final State court and Federal trial court decisions declaring eyewitness
testimony to be admissible."

8287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9

Id. at 69.
1Id.; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
12 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55 (1951); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
18 United States v. Meyers, 381 F.2d 814, 816 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) ; Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1967);
Crume v. Beto, 383 F. 2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
14 Id.
10 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

15 KAMIsAR, LOCKHART,

MENTS -

CHOPER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CASES -

COM-

QUESTIONS, [hereinafter cited as Kamisar), said:

Whether or not this traditional approach to police interrogation and
confessions makes good sense it constitutes very questionable history

318

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 4:316

proceeding except the police and the accused, what occurred be-

tween police and accused was usually a mystery and, became a
"swearing contest" as to what had actually happened.' 6 Usually
this contest was won by the police.'1 Moreover,
. . . frequently the defendant was inarticulate, which aggravated
the difficulties of recreating the tenor and atmosphere of the police
questioning or the manner in which the appropriate advice about
the suspect's rights might have been or, if properly given, subsequently undermined.,

The procedures used by police to get confessions and incriminating statements had become so effective that major works
had been written to record various methods and techniques in
interrogations." Inbau and Reid conclusively indicate a scientifically and psychologically oriented approach to breaking a

person's resistance. 20

These methods, in addition to the police-

oriented atmosphere, perhaps exaggerated by the fright and
weakness of the individual, created a poor environment for pro2
tection of constitutional rights. 1
Disturbed by the apparent ineffectiveness of the totality test
to curb excesses of police and protect the right of an accused to
a fair trial, the court turned to the sixth amendment right to

counsel. 22 Basically the court increased the scope of a person's
right to counsel to include many pre-trial procedures to remove
some of the secrecy and suspected abuses of these pre-trial confrontations.

The implementation and development of the right to
counsel as a procedural safeguard is seen in three cases prior
In none of the thirty-odd state confession cases decided by the Court
since the first such case in 1936 had the privilege against self-incrimination as it applied to judicial proceedings been the controlling standard.
Id. at 617-18; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S.
436 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
18 Kamisar at 612. See the brutal beatings in Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936), or the 36 consecutive hours of questioning present in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee 322 U.S. 143 (1944). For a series of cases showing
excessive police brutality see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at
nn.6 and 7.
....

17Id.

'8 Kamisar at 612.
19 F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS. This
book stresses, among other things, the absolute need for privacy, the requirement that an interrogator "display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt."
The book recommends calling "attention to the subject's physiological and
psychological symptoms of guilt" in an effort to [destroy] or [diminish]
his confidence in his ability to deceive . . ." and ". . to convince him of the
futility of further resistance." Another interesting tactic discussed in this
book is "if the subject refuses to discuss the matter under investigation
concede to him the right to remain silent, and then proceed to point out the
incriminating significance of his refusal."
20 Id. at 23, 29, 111.
21 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
22 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); 47 NEB. L. REv. 740 (1968); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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to Wade: Spano v. New York, 2- Escobedo v. Illinois24 and Miranda v. Arizona;25 the holdings and legal reasoning of these
cases are important to a proper understanding of Wade because
Wade used the reasoning of and relied heavily on these immediately preceding cases. They all deal with the same broad area of
protection of the rights of an accused from abuses by police by
providing counsel.
In Spano v. New York, 2 three of the concurring justices

wanted to reverse on the right to counsel argument concerning
the admissibility of a confession. But the majority said:
We find it unnecessary to reach that contention, for we find use of
the confession obtained here inconsistent
with the fourteenth
2
amendment under traditional principles.
The Spano court did recognize however, that:
.. . as law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the
methods used to extract confessions more sophisticated, our duty to
enforce federal constitutional protections .

.

. becomes more diffi-

28
cult because of the more delicate judgments to be made.
It is clear that the court was showing its growing disenchantment
with the old test.
Escobedo v. Illinois29 used the right to counsel as a pre-trial
"procedural safeguard" to protect the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination. In that case the court held the right to coun-

sel commences "

. .

. where

. . .

the investigation

. . .

has begun

to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. . . . "0 No
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be
31
used against the defendant unless counsel is provided or waived.
23

360 U.S. 315 (1959).

24378 U.S. 478 (1964).

25 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 360 U.S. 315 (1959).

Id. at 320.
28 Id. The Spano court said:
27

The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deeprooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves. Accordingly, the actions of police in
obtaining confessions have come under scrutiny in a long series of cases.
Those cases suggest that in recent years law enforcement officials have
become increasingly aware of the burden which they share, along with
our courts, in protecting fundamental rights of our citizenry, including
that portion of our citizenry suspected of crime ....
But as law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to
extract confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult
because of the more delicate judgments to be made.
Id. at 320-21.
29378 U.S. 478 (1964).
80 Id. at 490-91.

81 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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Using the test of when the right to counsel may be invoked
it was clear that formal indictment was not relevant.
It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel,
under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the
interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment.
Petitioners had,
for all practical purposes, already been charged
2
with murder

The Court went on to reply to what would later be called the law
and order argument. The court said in effect that the critical
stage of a criminal prosecution when an accused's right to fair
treatment at the hands of the authorities could be abused is precisely what invoked the constitutional right to counsel:
It is argued that if the right to counsel is afforded prior to
indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the police will
diminish significantly, because most confessions are obtained during the period between arrest and indictment, and 'any lawyer
worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make
no statement to police under any circumstances.' This argument,
of course, cuts two ways. The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical nature as a 'stage
when legal aid and advice' are surely needed. The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship
between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a
confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his
need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes
the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his
lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination33

Hence, in Escobedo the test used to determine whether a right
to counsel exists was when the authorities "focus on a particular
suspect." 4 Once this test is satisfied a "critical stage" of the
proceeding arises at which an accused is entitled to counsel. An
important thing to note is that the court rejected any notion that
satisfaction of this test depended on the occurrence of indictment.8
Two years later in Miranda the Court made a further expansion of "procedural safeguards," again without regard to
whether an indictment had been obtained. The Court felt that
"[t]he presence of an attorney, and the Miranda warning delivered to an individual, enable the defendant under otherwise
compelling circumstances, to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminate the evils in the interrogation
process." 86 The Court said that once custodial interrogation had
82
3

1d. at 485-86.

8Id.at 488.

3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1d. at 486. "The interrogation here unlike Massiah was conducted
before petitioner was formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that
35

fact should make no difference ...
36 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
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begun the accused had a right to receive the "four Mirandawarnings. ' 3 The Court then defined custodial interrogation as "...
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."" It is apparent that the
definition of custodial interrogation in no way depends on the
period at which a person is indicted. In fact, the Court indicated
that third degree types of interrogation almost invariably take
place during the period between arrest and preliminary examination, which is before indictment 9
"

The parallel between Wade, Escobedo and Miranda is unmistakable. All three are concerned with pre-trial police procedures.40

All three were concerned with the subtleties of psy-

chologically oriented interrogations.41 Finally, each of them was
an attempt to counter the secrecy and police dominated atmosphere of their respective pre-trial proceeding. 42 In Escobedo the
test used to mark the beginning of a "critical stage" at which
counsel was required was "focus on a particular suspect." The
Escobedo court clearly rejected the contention that the start of
this critical stage depended on the obtaining of an indictment.
In Miranda the test of "custodial interrogation" did not require
indictment.4 The critical stage in Wade is the line-up, just as
"focus on a particular suspect" and "custodial interrogation" is
in Escobedo and Miranda. By analogy, this critical stage should
not be dependent on whether an indictment has been procured.
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. WADE

In Wade, several weeks after the defendant had been indicted for bank robbery and counsel had been appointed to represent him, without notice to his appointed counsel, he was placed
in a line-up at which two witnesses identified the defendant as
the robber. These prior line-up identifications were elicited on
cross-examination after an in-court identification.45 The Court
held that the line-up was a "critical stage" of the prosecution" at
which the accused was entitled to the aid of counsel, and both he
81Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement that he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to an attorney, either re-

tained
8 or appointed. Id. at 445-46.
8Id.at 444.
89
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Wickersham Report) at 169 (1931).
40388 U.S. 218 (1967); 378 U.S. 478 (1964); 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41 E.g., 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966).
42 Id.at 445.
48 See note 32 supra.
44 See notes 31 and 32 supra; Note, The Right to Counsel at Pre-trial
Lineups,
63 Nw. U.L. REv. 251 257-58 (1968).
5

4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967).
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and his counsel should have been notified of the impending line-up
proceeding.4
The Court at the outset said, "Neither the line-up itself nor
anything shown by this record that Wade was required to do
in the line-up violated his privilege against self-incrimination." "
The reasoning for its holding dealt purely with the accused's
right to counsel and it related particularly to his right to be able
8
to meaningfully cross-examine his witnesses against him."
The presence of counsel at such critical confrontation, as at the
trial itself, operates to assure that the accused's interests will be
protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal
4

prosecution. "

The Court's distaste for pre-trial line-ups, confrontations,
and other forms of identification procedures referred to in Wade,
centered upon unreliability of eye-witness testimony, the secrecy
surrounding identification, and the opportunity they supposedly
afford for prejudicial police suggestions. 50 Hence, the main purpose of requiring counsel at the line-up was to enable the attorney to "reconstruct through cross-examination, the circumstances
under which he [the accused] was originally identified." 51 In
this way, the attorney could point out defects in the line-up proceedings which, if sufficiently unfair, could be violative of "due
46 Id. at 236; Wade did not establish a per se rule of exclusion.
In court
identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before trial in
the absence of counsel or notification of counsel must be excluded, unless it
can be shown that such identification had a source independent of the illegal
line-up or that error in its admission was harmless.

47 Id. at 221.

48 Id.; Note, The Right to Counsel at Pre-trialLineups, 63 Nw. U.L. Rav.
251, 255 (1968).
49 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
50 Id. at 228-30; Note, The Right to Counsel at Pre-trial Lineups, 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 251, 253 (1968).
51 Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings; A
Problem in Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U.
PiTr'. L. REv. 65, 72 (1967). For detailed analysis of the function of counsel
at line-up see Comment, The Right to Counsel During PretrialIdentification
Proceedings - An Examination, 47 NEB. L. Ray. 740, 748 (1968). For a
view of the difficult positions of defendants in attempting to protest the
manner of pre-trial identification see People v. Shields, 70 Cal. App. 2d 628,
634-35, 161 P.2d 475, 478-79 (1945); People v. Hicks, 22 Ill. 2d 364, 176
N.E.2d 810 (1961); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512, 394 P.2d 106 (1964). See
also Note, United States v. Wade: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 1 JOHN MAR.
J. PaAc. & PROC. 285 (1968).
First, the presence of counsel is the only way to insure that irregularities tending to produce incorrect identification may be noticed and
presented adequately at trial. Second, counsel may be able to prevent at
least some irregularities from occurring.
We characterized in Long the Supreme Court's rationale in Wade
to be that of the difficulty attendant upon accurately reconstructing the
exact circumstance of the pretrial confrontation, and the useful role
which counsel can play not only in the process but in suggesting procedures which might render the confrontation legally unassailable thereafter.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967).
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process" and otherwise could diminish the weight of such pretrial identification.52
Arguments Against Application of Wade to
Pre-indictment Line-ups
The arguments supporting the proposition that Wade applies only to post-indictment situations are few in number and
not very convincing. One argument supporting the proposition
that Wade applies only to post-indictment situations is that the
facts of the Wade decision concerned a post-indictment police
line-up. 53 Hence, a strict interpretation of Wade, if limited to
its particular fact situation, would dictate that it applied only
5
to a post-indictment situation.

4

Another argument is that by rejecting the fifth amendment
contention, 55 the Wade court could be showing an unwillingness
to analogize Wade with the Escobedo and Miranda decisions,
which explicitly interweave the defendant's right to counsel with
his privilege against self-incrimination.56 That is, the Court
might wish to limit the right to counsel to just post-indictment
line-ups, whereas Miranda and Escobedo recognized this right
regardless of whether the accused had been formally indicted or
not. This distinction in the Court's reasoning could defeat the
making of an analogy between Wade and Miranda - Escobedo
for some interpreters of Wade.
It must be noted that in one place in the opinion, the Wade
Court does appear to limit its holdings to post-indictment lineups. After speaking about abuses which could occur at a line-up,
the Court says:
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable
of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can
often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at
trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment
line-up was [a] critical stage of the prosecution at which he was5 7'as
much entitled to such aid of counsel .. .as at the trial itself.'

This is the only statement by the Court indicating a possible
limitation on Wade to post-indictment line-ups. This may have
been merely a discussion of a broader rule as it applied to Wade's
particular situation.58 But there is a possibility that the Court
52

See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), where defendant attempts

to attack hospital identification through due-process since no right to counsel
exists.
53
54 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967).
Note, Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade & Gilbert, 36 U. Cm. L.
REv. 830, 838 (1969).

55See note 48 supra.

56 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
5 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
58United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 1970)
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did intend to limit Wade to post-indictment situations as it did
not want to extend its position too far and therefore, leave room
for the States to develop their own means of conducting fair
line-ups.95
Arguments for Application of Wade to Pre-indictmentLine-ups
There seems to be considerably more support for the proposition that United States v. Wade applies to both pre and postindictment line-ups. The most obvious argument is that in Wade
there is continual reference to the Escobedo-Mirandacategory of
cases.60 There appears to be an attempt to analogize these decisions dealing with police interrogation to the line-up situation.
As stated before, this analogy may not be supportable, since the
former cases linked right to counsel with the fifth amendment,
whereas, in Wade, the fifth amendment argument was rejected.,"
The Supreme Court, however, seems to offer strong support to
the view that the analogy is not defeated by this distinction.
Of course, nothing decided or said in the opinions in the cited
cases [Miranda, Escobedo, Hamilton, Massiah] links the right to
counsel only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights. Rather
those decisions 'no more than [reflect] a constitutional principle
established as long as Powell v. Alabama

* *

*' Massiah v.

United States, supra. It is central to the principle that in addition
to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he
need not stand alone against the State at any stage if the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of that right is as much the aim of the right to62 counsel
as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.
Hence, the Court appears to conceive of Wade in the same vein
as it did Mirandaand Escobedo and in neither of these cases was
there a pre or post-indictment distinction.
Furthermore, the Wade Court throughout its entire opinion,
except in the one area cited above, never qualifies its statements
regarding line-ups to pre or post-indictment. That is, its disTurning to the 'line-up' issue, we note that United States v. Wade, supra,
held that a defendant is entitled to the aid of counsel at any time a
'critical stage' exists, such as a post-indictment line-up. This was a
pre-indictment line-up, but we find no different general rules apply between a pre-indictment and a post-indictment line-up. Each must be fair

to the ultimate defendant. We hold the defendant was entitled to counsel

at either, so as to promote and insure fairness at the confrontation, and a
full hearing at the trial on the issue of identification.
Hence, Phillips indicates that Wade made reference to a post-indictment
line-up only as an example of one of the times when this right to counsel
exists especially as applied to the particular facts of Wade.
59Note, United States v. Wade: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 1 JOHN
MAl. J. PRAC. AND P.oc. 285 (1968); 388 U.S. 218 (1967); The Right to
Counsel During Pretrial Identification Proceedings - An Examination, 47
NEB. L. REV. 740, 747-48 (1968).
60 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
61 See note 51 supra.
62 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27 (1967).
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cussion of line-ups refers generally to all pre-trial line-ups.
Hence, as expressed by one commentator in some of the opinion,
The wording of Wade seems to limit the effect of the decision to
post-indictment identifications only, these words were probably

meant as words of description rather than as words limiting the
scope of the Court's opinion.63
A similar strict interpretation of Escobedo was clearly rejected
in Miranda.64

This general reference to all line-ups is also evident in the
Court's lengthy discussion of the abuses which can and do occur

at line-up proceedings.
But the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused
and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable
factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair
trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known:
the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification 5
It would not be realistic or logical to say that these abuses could
only occur during a post-indictment line-up and not at one which
66
occurs before an indictment.
The Court was concerned with the potential for prejudice in
pre-trial confrontation, not with whether they took place before or
after indictment. If the Court decides that constitutional rights
have been violated, it is doubtful whether the fact that the accused has
not yet been indicted will cause the Court to deny
67
relief.
Another indication of the Court's intention as to the application and scope of Wade is Justice White's dissenting opinion in
Wade. In his dissent, White criticizes the majority for going as
far as they did in expanding the breadth of the right to counsel.
The rule applies to any lineup, to any other techniques employed to produce an identification and a fortiori to a face-to-face

encounter between the witness and the suspect alone, regardless of
when the identification occurs, in time or place, and whether before or after indictment or information. 8
From this dissenting opinion, it appears that Justice White, having been part of the Court's deliberations, knew that the majority
63 The Right to Counsel at Pre-trial Lineups, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 251,
257-58 (1968).
64M...
65 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
66 The Right to Counsel During Pretrial Identification Proceedings An Examination, 47 NEB. L. REV. 740, 747 (1968).
67 The Right to Counsel at Pre-trial Lineups, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 251,
257-58 (1968); 36 U. CHI. L. Rav. 830, 840 (1969). There seems to be no
reason to limit Wade and Gilbertas the same problems exist at the pre-indictment stage that exist at the post-indictment stage. The problems are suggestiveness in the line-up proceedings and the fact that this line-up identification
is usually stuck to by the witness. See 47 NEB. L. REV. 740, 747 (1968).
. 68United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 251 (1967) (Justice White's
dissenting opinion).
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intended for this right to counsel to exist whether the line-up was
pre-indictment or post-indictment.
Finally, it appears that this pre/post-indictment test is too
mechanical to adequately protect an accused's constitutional
rights.
Admittedly, limiting the scope of the right to counsel by the
application of the simple pre/post-indictment dichotomy would lend
itself to easy administration by the Courts. Unfortunately, it
would also leave the police in the position to manipulate the applicability of the right to counsel by holding all identification procedures before the indictment thus defeating the aim of the Wade
and Gilbert rulings.6 9

Thus, while it appears that isolated parts of the Wade opinion can be used to support the proposition that Wade applies only
to post-indictment line-ups, it is more logical from the reasoning
in Wade and the opinion as a whole to say that application of
Wade is not dependent on indictment. This is especially true
when considering the judicial atmosphere, created by Escobedo
and Miranda,which gave rise to Wade.
INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO WADE BY OTHER COURTS

The "extent of this right [to counsel at pre-trial confrontations] in particular circumstances has yet to be authoritatively
determined. ' ' 70

Gilbert v. California,71 decided the same day as

Wade, also held that a post-indictment pre-trial line-up at which
the accused was exhibited to identifying witnesses was a critical
stage of the criminal proceedings entitling the accused to the assistance of counsel. Since this case also dealt with a post-indictment line-up, no light is shed on the pre-indictment situation.
The next Supreme Court case of any significance in this area
was Biggers v. Tennessee.72 This was a rape case where the suspect was identified in a stationhouse identification. While not a
line-up identification, it was pre-indictment and no attorney was
present. Justice Douglas, who was on the Court when Wade and
Gilbert were decided, in a dissenting opinion said, "[t]his procedure of identification violates, of course, United States v. Wade
0?78

In Foster v. California,74 the defendant could not rely on
Wade because of Wade's non-retroactivity ;75 however, in refer69 Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade & Gilbert, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
830, 837 (1969).
70 United States v. O'Connor, 282 F. Supp. 963, 964 (D.D.C. 1968); also,
there has been no decision by the Supreme Court explaining Wade.
71 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
72 390 U.S. 404
73 Id. at 406.

(1967).

74 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
75 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)

held that Wade and Gilbert
affect those cases and all future cases which involve confrontation for identification purposes conducted in the absence of counsel after June 12, 1967.
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ring to Wade and Gilbert the majority opinion said, " . . . this
Court held that because of the possibility of unfairness to the

accused in the way a line-up is conducted, a line-up is a 'critical
stage' in the prosecution, at which the accused must be given the

opportunity to be represented by counsel. ''76 So the Supreme
Court, in speaking of its own decision in Wade, does not limit it
to post-indictment. This is the extent of the Supreme Court's
reference to the Wade case concerning the scope of its applications.
Federal Appellate Courts

Every federal circuit which has expressly considered the
issues has rejected the post-indictment limitation. 77 The third
circuit in the case of United States v. Russell78 appeared to favor

the broad interpretation of Wade, when it agreed with the statement by the fifth circuit in Rivers v. United States79 which said,

"[w]ith Miranda on the books, it is indisputable that most, perhaps all lineups occurring after arrest will fall within the rules
'
0
announced in Wade and Gilbert."
In the fifth circuit the leading case is Rivers v. United States

cited above.

This circuit was the father of the Wade decision 8 '

and appears anxious to apply Wade to any pre-trial confrontation
76 394 U.S. at 442 (1969).
7 United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2nd Cir. 1970) ; United States
v. Russel, 405 F.2d 1119 (3rd Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Rivers, 400 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. Ranciglio, 429 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1970) ; People v. Cruz, 415 F.2d
336 (9th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ;
Mason v. United States 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Long v. United
States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.d. Cir. 1969).
78405 F.2d 119, 1122 and n.9 (3rd Cir. 1969); see United States v.
Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1307 (3rd Cir. 1970) where the Court said that Wade
applied at least to post-indictment line-ups, indicating that it probably applied
to more than just post-indictment situations. The Court then went on to
extend Wade to pre-trial photographic identification of an accused who is
in custody thus again showing an unrestrictive interpretation of Wade.
But see United States v. Shannon, 424 F.2d 476 (3rd Cir. 1970) where the
court said in dicta, in referring to the Wade decision, "the Supreme Court
held that a post-indictment line-up was a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which the accused was guaranteed the right to counsel." Id.
at 477.
79400
F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).
80
1d. at 939.
81 Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1969). In River v.
United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968) the court looks with pride at
its decision of Wade v. United States.
In Stovall v. Denno the Court recognized that the law enforcement
officials of the Federal Government and all 50 states had proceeded on the
assumption that counsel was not necessary at a lineup or an out-ofcourt confrontation. Standing by itself, alone and unaided by specific
precedents, was the decision of this Court on Wade v. United States,
5 Cir., 1966, 358 F.2d 557. It foreshadowed a reversal in the line of
decisions.
Id. at 939.
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82

after arrest.
Here the confrontation occurred at a hospital and
the victim identified the accused from a stretcher immediately
after the shooting. The Court held Wade applicable and re83
versed the conviction on the right to counsel issue.
The ninth circuit case of United States v. Phillips 4 uses
Wade as authority for its holding that an accused has a right to
counsel at a pre-indictment line-up.
Turning to the 'line-up issue,' we note that United States v. Wade
held that a defendant is entitled to the aid of counsel at any time a
'critical stage' exists, such as a post-indictment line-up. This was
a pre-indictment line-up, but we find no different general rules
apply between a pre-indictment and a post-indictment line-up.
Each must be fair to the ultimate defendant. We hold the defendant was entitled to counsel at either, so as to promote and
insure fairness at the confrontation, and a full hearing at the trial
on the issue of identification. 5
In United States v. Ayers,86 from the second circuit the lineups were clearly before indictment, yet the Court applied United
States v. Wade.
We hold, however, that a separate and different warning was required with reference to the lineups. The defendant should have
been told that there was to be a lineup for the purpose of possible
identification and that he was entitled to have his lawyer or one
provided by the State present at the lineup. This is the clear import of the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Wade.87
However, because there was an independent source for the identification, the conviction was affirmed.

Also, the appellate court of the eighth circuit made no distinction between pre and post-indictment situations, but affirmed
the lower court conviction because there was an independent
source of identification.88 The line-up occurred the same evening
82 Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1968) :
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Wade and Gilbert put it in terms
of right to counsel. They held that confrontations between suspects and
witnesses were a 'critical stage' of the criminal proceedings against
an accused and counsel must be present at these confrontations unless
waived. With Miranda on the books it is indisputable that most, perhaps all, confrontations occurring aiter will fall within the rules announced in Wade and Gilbert. We recognize the risk of ever letting a
dissenter speak momentarily for the Court as to what it has really
held, but Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Wade said 'the rule applies
to any lineup, to any other techniques employed to produce an identification and a fortiorito a face-to-face encounter between the witness and
the suspect alone, regardless of when the identification occurs, in time
or place, and whether before or after indictment of information.'

83 Id.
84 427

F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1970).

85 Id. at 1037; see People v. Cruz, 415 F.2d 336, 337 n.1 (9th Cir. 1969).
86 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970).
87

Id. at 527.

88 United States v. Ranciglio and United States v. Corzine, 429 F.2d 228

(8th Cir. 1970).
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as the arrest, a fact which the Court italicized for emphasis.8

9

Although there was no indictment the Court ruled that these
line-up procedures " . . . violated the constitutional standards set
forth in United States v. Wade."90 In United States v. Greene,9
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
held that the right to counsel arises even before arrest.
However, since our decision in Long v. United States, it is clear
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a pretrial confrontation for purposes of identification does not turn automatically upon
the existence vel non of legal arrest. In Mason the pre-trial confrontation in issue took place after arrest but prior to indictment.
It, therefore, nullified any thought that, because Wade involved a
defendant in custody after indictment, the right to counsel for pretrial identification purposes attaches only after indictment. On the
instant appeal, the Government's position is that the right does
to arrest. Long building upon Mason,
not come into being prior
92
negates the proposition.

Long v. United States,9 ' cited in Greene, applied Wade to a
pre-arrest, squad room confrontation. The reasoning concerning suggestiveness, however, is an indication of the context in
which Wade is considered and understood by the lower federal
court.
The Supreme Court expressly held its ruling applicable to the informal 'show-up' in which witnesses are confronted by a single
suspect. Indeed, the more informal the confrontation procedure
the greater is the danger of suggestiveness, and the greater the
difficulty of ascertaining at trial the facts of the 'confrontation.'
The sources of suggestiveness in an eyewitness identification are
subtle, and the suspect is less likely to be alert to the need9 4 for safeguards when no formal process has issued against him.

Finally, United States v. Broadhead,5 which is a seventh
circuit case, held that a pre-indictment line-up in the absence
of counsel was a " . .. violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as enunciated in Wade and Gilbert."" In this case however, the conviction was affirmed because there was an independent source.
So in a vast majority of the Federal Appeals cases, Wade
89 Id. at 231; see also United States v. Valez, 431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir.
1970). There is no dispute as to the applicability of Wade in the instant
case since the challenged lineup . . . occurred . . . over 4 months after the

indictment.
90/d.
91429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
92Id. at 196; see also Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1969) where it was held that no exception from the Wade requirement was
established by the fact that a pre-indictment eyewitness confrontation
occurred at a preliminary hearing in the General Sessions Courtroom.
There would be even less basis for an exemption from Wade for an identification occurring in a police squad room.
93 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
94 Id. at 802-03.
95 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969).
96 Id. at 1354.
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did not apply because it was prospective only. Yet, it was apparent that the Courts discussed Wade, even in pre-indictment
situations, and sometimes in pre-arrest confrontations, as though
97
it would have applied had the case been decided after Wade.
Indictment was not thought to be significant; the rules for lineups and confrontations were treated generally."
Federal Trial Courts
The district court decisions are less in number but appear to
generally hold Wade applicable to all line-ups, both before and
after indictment. There is only one district court decision reported which seems to limit Wade to post-indictment. This is
the decision of United States ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan" from
the District Court of New York. In that case the court could
not apply Wade because Wade is not retroactive; yet in speaking
of the Wade decision in dicta, it said the Wade decision, ... announced that the sixth amendment requires the presence of counsel when a witness identifies a defendant after his indictment and
before his trial."'10 0 Although this is only dicta, it may be an
indication as to how the Federal District Court of New York
will apply Wade when the opportunity arises. In Bratten v.
Delaware,"' the court is equivocal as to the significance of indictment. It attacks the problem by a consideration of "criticalness." The case represents a pre-arrest situation which, of
course, is also pre-indictment. The court said, " ... it appears
from these cases [Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall] the Supreme Court
considers that a confrontation is a "critical stage" in a criminal
prosecution, requiring counsel to be present only when a defendant becomes an "accused" within the rule of Escobedo v.
Illinois.102 Hence, it appears that this court feels that Wade
should be interpreted in light of Escobedo which ignores any
such distinction as pre or post-indictment and, in fact, indicates
that whether a person has been formally indicted or not should
make no difference.
The remaining district court decisions have clearly utilized
the broader interpretation of the Wade decision.10
Two very
97 United States v. Shannon, 424 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1970).

98 Wise v. United States, 383 F.2d 206, 209 (1970) ; Crume v. Beto 383
F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1970).

The most recent decisions of the Supreme Court declare that a suspect
has the right to counsel at an identification lineup. United States v.

Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.. 263 (1967).
The Court held that a lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution, at
which counsel must be present.
Id. at 38.
9 288 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
100 Id. at 166.
101 307 F. Supp. 643 (D. Del. 1969).
"02 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
103 Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856, 862 (D. Mass. 1970), where the
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explicit cases in this area are United States v. Clarko4 and United
States v. Wilson.105 In United States v. Clark, a pre-indictment
case, the court said:
The government has urged that Wade and Gilbert are distinguishable from this case because the confrontation here occurred the
same day as the robbery whereas the confrontations in those cases

took place at a later stage in the prosecution, i.e. in Wade the
lineup was conducted forty days after the defendant's arrest, several weeks after his indictment, and fifteen days after appointment of his lawyer, and in Gilbert the lineup was conducted sixteen days after his indictment and after appointment of counsel.
The government makes the related claim that the circumstances
surrounding the confrontation in Wade and Gilbert much more
clearly reflected '(T)he potential for improper influences * * *'

than did the circumstances surrounding this confrontation, ....,06
The court answered this contention by using the "criticalness"
language of Miranda and Escobedo and by explaining some of
the mechanics of the Wade decision.
Regardless of the relative merit of any of these distinctions
which the government advances the Court still must reject its
basic argument that the fairness of a confrontation can insulate
it from the Wade and Gilbert holdings. This is so because the
Court was so concerned with the prejudice to the defendant potentially inherent in all such procedures that it held that fairness
to the defendant effectively could be insured only by a uniform
rule requiring the presence of counsel at any confrontation which
occurred at a 'critical' stage of the prosecution. Therefore, a trial
court reviewing a challenged pre-trial confrontation is not to inquire whether that confrontation was conducted in a fair or unfair
manner, but rather, is to inquire only whether that confrontation
occurred at a 'critical' stage of the prosecution. If so, regardless
of the demonstrated fairness of the confrontation, if defense counsel was not present at the confrontation identification testimony
which is the fruit of that confrontation must be barred at trial.
Limiting the trial court's inquiry in this fashion reflected the
Court's belief that even if a particular confrontation was in fact
fair the absence of counsel from that confrontation at least in
theory might hamper cross-examination and, therefore, deprive
the defendant of his right to fair trial.
In the present case it is clear the government's prosecution
of the defendant had reached a 'critical' stage .

. .

. [S]ince the

Supreme Court's oft-cited decision in Powell v. State of Alabama,
*

.

. courts have recognized that pre-trial stages other than indict-

ment are 'critical,' if the absence of counsel from such stages
would derogate substantially
from the defendant's rights under the
10 7
Sixth Amendment.

Hence, the court held conclusively that the defendant's motion to
court held that while the defendant was in custody, although not as yet
indicted for the robbery, he was entitled to be informed of the prospect of

a show-up at the police station and of his right to have counsel present.
104 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
105 283 F. Supp. 914 (D.D.C. 1968).
106 289 F. Supp. 610, 625 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
107 Id. at 626-27.
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suppress the identifications in the absence of counsel must be
granted. 08
In United States v. Wilson the line-up occurred before indictment and the court held that the stationhouse identification
should be suppressed on the basis of Wade, saying:
While both Wade and Gilbert refer to post-indictment lineups,

a stationhouse identification is an equally critical stage of the

prosecution. The majority in Wade impliedly recognized this in its
reference to the use of substitute counsel where notification and
presence of the suspect's own counsel would result in prejudicial
delay. Moreover, three members of the Supreme Court expressly
apply 'whether before or after instated that the Wade standards
dictment or information." 0 9
A final illustrative district court case, United States v.
Pate,110 is from a district for the State of Illinois. Here petitioner brought a habeas corpus petition to Federal District court
directly from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The
government moved to dismiss based on the grounds that petitioner failed to exhaust available state remedies."' Petitioner
contended that he was deprived of his right to counsel at a line-up
conducted after his arrest but before his indictment. He further
contended that based on People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244
N.E.2d (1969), exhausting his state remedies would be futile
since Palmer "has determined that the decisions cited above
[Wade, Gilbert, Stovall] are not binding as to pre-indictment confrontations.

12
11

This court does not find that petitioner's remedies here are
clearly ineffective or futile. The Illinois Supreme Court has
stated -in Palmer that Wade and Gilbert do not apply to pre-indictment confrontations, but in the context of the case such a
broad statement was unwarranted.

Neither Palmer nor Cesarz

involved in [sic] actual line-up, and Cesarz concerned an identification made prior to arrest while the defendant was in a crowd at a
motel swimming pool. Since the fact situation alleged here presents a much clearer case, the appeal does not appear to be to
clearly futile that exhaustion should be excused.

Rather, comity

would dictate that federal intervention be withheld and the Illinois Supreme Court be permitted to pass on the merits of petitioner's claim in light of more recent federal decisions and the present
fact situation.13

Finally, this court states that the language in Palmer regarding
Wade was merely dictum and there is no guarantee that the
court will apply this dictum to the instant case. It says that
petitioner should let his claims be passed on by the Illinois Su0
8Id.
at 630.
109 283 F. Supp. 914 (D.D.C. 1968).
1970).
110 312 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ill.

MId.
112 Id.

-1Id. at 495-96.
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preme Court "in light of the more recent federal decisions." 1
These "federal decisions" as indicated above hold Wade applicable to pre and post-indictment line-ups, not just pre-indictment
line-ups.
ILLINOIS

Interpretation of Wade by Illinois courts is still controlled
by the case of People v. Palmer.15
In Palmer,the defendant contended that the courtroom identification should not have been admitted on the basis of Wade
and Gilbert because the identification in court was the product
of a pre-trial confrontation between defendant and victim in the
absence of defendant's counsel.' 6 The court answers this contention by distinguishing Wade and Gilbert:
In our opinion these 'lineup' decisions apply only to post-indictment
confrontations. We reach this decision because of the language of
the United States Supreme Court in these cases and the subsequent
case of Simmons v. United States."7

The court then takes isolated language from Wade and Gilbert
to support their opinion, disregarding the reasons and purposes
of the Wade and Gilbert opinions and ignoring the basic rationale
of the opinion as a whole." 8 Moreover, the Illinois court in
Palmer cites Simmons v. United States' 9 as a Supreme Court
case supporting their view, although Simmons was a photo12
graphic identification case and had nothing to do with line-ups. 0
Also, in that case, the defendant did not contend that he had a
right to counsel based on Wade, but instead urged the "totality
of circumstances" argument. 21 Finally, the quote the court takes
from the Simmons case as already discussed, could just as easily
support the view that Wade and Gilbert apply to all line-ups,
both before and after indictment.
Although the court's holdings concerning Wade was not
necessary to the outcome or determination of the case, and was
therefore merely judicial dictum, the Illinois courts, especially
the appellate court, have taken this Palmer dictum as the law.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has taken a somewhat ambiguous approach to the indictment question in subsequent cases
1 22
and thereby weakened Palmer as precedent. In People v. Davis'
114Id.

115 41 Ill.
2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
116 Id. at 572, 244 N.E.2d at 174.
117

Id.

11s 41 Ill.
2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969) ; Right to Counsel at Lineups:

Wade & Gilbert, 36 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 830, 837 (1969).
119 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
120

121
122

Id.
Id. at 382-83.

45 Ill.
2d 514, 261 N.E.2d 314 (1970).
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the line-up occurred July, 1967 and defendant was not indicted
until October, 1967. The Illinois Supreme Court said:
In Gilbert v. California, the Supreme Court, referring to Wade,
stated: 'We there held that a post-indictment pretrial lineup at

which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical
stage of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a
lineup without notice to and in absence of his counsel denies the
accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the
accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.' While the circumstances of the defendant's viewing by the witnesses called into
question their in-court identification of the defendant, the record
here permits what the Supreme Court in Gilbert referred to as an
'informed judgment' that the witnesses' identifications were based
by their viewing
on observations independent of and uninfluenced
123
of the defendant at the police station.

So in Davis, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled out Wade's
applicability on the basis of Palmer. Yet, the court proceeds to
admit the identification saying that there was an "independent
source." This language is precisely the language and reasoning
Wade uses to determine admissibility of an out-of-court identi12 4
fication.
In People v. Johnson,'12 although it is difficult to determine
when the identification occurred, the court again disposed of the
26
case by finding an independent source. In People v. Johnson,'
the defendant urged that his pre-indictment line-up was violative of Wade because "the State failed to show clear and convincing proof that the victim's identification of defendant was
derived from an observation independent of the line-up encounter.' 1 27 The State contended that Palmer was authority for
the proposition that in Illinois Wade only applies to post-indictment identifications. The defendant conceded that Palmer was
controlling but urged that Palmer be overruled. Hence, the
court recognized the defendant's contention concerning a violation of Wade. Yet, it declined the opportunity to reiterate the
Palmer interpretation after reporting the attack upon it and
merely decided that, "[w]hile the defendant challenges the identification under Stovall as well, we are not prepared to find it
insufficient and therefore need not discuss the defendant's argu28
ment as to Palmer.'
The remainder of the Supreme Court cases from Illinois reject Wade because it is prospective only. 29 Hence, a study of
123

Id. at 517, 261 N.E.2d at 315-16.

124

See note 46 supra.

125 45 Ill. 2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57 (1970).
126

127

Id.

Id. at 291, 259 N.E.2d at 62.

129 Ie.
People
128

v. Derengowski, 44 111. 2d 476, 256 N.E.2d 455 (1970) ; People
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the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court does not produce complete certainty as to the Illinois interpretation of Wade.
However, all of the Illinois appellate court decisions dealing
with the indictment issue, conclusively hold that Wade and Gilbert established the principle that a defendant is entitled to have
counsel present only at a post-indictment line-up. As authority
for this proposition they cite People v. Palmer and follow the
same line of reasoning that appeared in the Palmer case.""
EFFECT OF TITLE II ON WADE

No discussion of Wade would be complete without mention
of the effect on Wade of Title II of the 1968 Omnibus Safe
Streets and Crime Control Act.' 31 This piece of legislation was
designed by Congress to significantly modify, if not destroy, the
constitutional safeguards developed by the Supreme Court
1 2
through the Escobedo, Miranda, and Wade decisions. The basis for Congressional action in this area, is the authority of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where
the Supreme Court stated the Congress had independent authority, to which the Courts would defer, to interpret the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment."
Sections 3501 and 3502 are the sections which could affect
Wade. Section 3501 appears to be in direct conflict with Miranda
by making the Miranda warnings merely factors to consider in
deciding on voluntariness, rather than constitutional prerequisites.'3 4 Section 3502 of the Act "appears to be in direct conflict
with Wade."'85 That section reads:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or
participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused
is being tried shall be admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial court ordained and established under Article
III of the Constitution of the United States. 136
v. Moor, 43 Ill. 2d 102, 251 N.E.2d 181 (1969); People v. Blumenshine, 42
Ill. 2d 508, 250 N.E.2d 152 (1969).
130 People v. Davis, 126 Ill. App. 2d 255, 261 N.E.2d 771 (1970) ; People
v. Jones, 125 Ill. App. 2d 30, 259 N.E.2d 585 (1970); People v. Kirby, 121
Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970); People v. Brown, 118 Ill. App. 2d
41 (1970), 254 N.E.2d 654 (1969) ; People v. Branscomb, 116 Ill. App. 2d 385,

254 N.E.2d 126 (1969); People v. Palmer, 120 Ill. App. 2d 471, 257 N.E.2d
172 (1970).
181 Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C.A. §3500 [hereinafter cited at Title II]. Note this act applies only
to federal prosecutions and is not binding on the States.
132

United States Code Congressionaland Administrative News at 2139;

1969 Supreme Ct. Rev. 81, 123; Title II.

1ss 384 U.S. 641
(1966); Burt, Miranda & Title II: A Morganatic
Marriage,1969 Supreme Ct. Rev. 81:
1"4 Burt, Miranda & Title II: A Morganatic Marriage,1969 Supreme Ct.

Rev. 81, 124-25; 18 U.S.C.A. §3501.
1'5 Id; 18 U.S.C.A. §3500.
186 Title II.
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The committee report gives the following analysis and criticism
as a basis for Section 3502.
The use of eyewitness testimony in the trial of criminal cases is an
essential prosecutorial tool. The recent case of United States v.
Wade, struck a harmful blow at the nation-wide effort to control
crime. The Court held that an in-court identification of the suspect by an eyewitness is inadmissible unless the prosecution can
show that the identification is independent of any prior identification by the witness while the suspect was in custody, and while his
court appointed lawyer was neither notified nor present. It is incredible that a victim is not permitted to identify his assailant in
court. The same is true of eyewitnesses who saw the victim assailed or murdered. The fact that eyewitness might on some occasion prior to trial have identified the accused, without a lawyer
for the accused being present, cannot in reason, law, or commonsense justify such a disastrous rule of evidence. Nothing in the
Constitution warrants it. To counter this harmful effect, the committee adopted that portion of title II providing that eyewitness
testimony is admissible in criminal prosecutions brought in the
Federal courts and that portion of title II that denies the Federal
courts the power to review the final State court and Federal trial
court decisions declaring eyewitness testimony to be admissible. 131
The constitutionality of this legislation has not yet been
determined. However, when the time comes for a decision, the
Court has several alternatives open to it.
Faced with apparent conflicts between these judicial decisions and
the legislative enactments, the Court may, of course, reassert its
earlier holdings in Miranda and Wade and declare the statute invalid to the extent that it conflicts with the decisions. However,
the appealing directness of this solution has never sufficed to make
it anything more than a last resort; statutes should be upheld if it
is at all possible to read them in consonance with the Constitution.
The Court has a variety of techniques for finding such compatibility. It may, for example, limit or distinguish its earlier holdings
and declare them not inconsistent with the legislature's own declarations. Conversely, it may tailor the statute, by appropriate
construction, to accord with its own prior decisions. Finally, the
Court may admit the conflict and decide that in this instance its
be superseded by
earlier interpretation of the Constitution may
138
reason of the conflicting legislative judgment.
The Harvard Law Review says that "Wade is a stronger case
than Miranda for judicial deference to Congressional fact-finding." 189 As Wade " ... announced a new, unexpected doctrine,
based on virtually no prior judicial experience; the conclusion is
thus more easily reached that the legislature is at least as wellequipped in this area as the Court to make the necessary factual
10
assessments."'
137 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News at 2139;
1969 Supreme Ct. Rev. 81, 123; Title II.

188 82 HARv. L. REv. 1392, 1394-95 (1969).
189 Id. at 1403.

140

Id.
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To this writer the conflict between Wade and Section 3502 of
the 1968 law is more apparent than necessary. While the section
was meant to nullify Wade, it was apparently based on two erroneous assumptions. The first being that no in-court witness
identification would be admissible if there had been a previous
line-up where counsel was not present; that the prosecution
would almost never be able to persuade the court that the witness's identification was of an "independent source." In reality
the rule of Wade has two exceptions to exclusion, "independent
source" and "harmless error." Subsequent cases have shown that
the courts have been fair, if not overly liberal, in finding that
there had been an independent source although an improper lineup had occurred in the interim,' 1 or that the lack of counsel at
the line-up was harmless error.
The second assumption was that Wade required counsel at
any out of court identification. 14 2 Instead, Wade said that to pre-

vent, or at least safeguard, against potential abuses and suggestiveness that can occur at line-up proceedings, an attorney
for the accused was required at those line-up proceedings. However, in recognition of the counterveilling interest of effective
criminal investigation, the requirement was only enforced by
making in-court identification, based on improper line-ups, inadmissible.
Hence, the statute can remain as it is, making a line-up identification one small exception to it.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in 1967 recognized that a line-up proceeding is a stage of the criminal prosecution fraught with potential abuses, especially in regard to suggestiveness. It was in
Wade. that the Court decided that counsel would not only be
helpful, but was a constitutional necessity.
Since Gideon v. Wainwright,143 judicial history, as fashioned
by the Warren Court, has exhibited an ever increasing trend to
widen the scope of constitutional protection through the development of the sixth amendment right to counsel at a trial 144 and is
now at the stage where this right exists at a police line-up proIt is an understatement, of course, to say that the rights of a criminal

defendant in pre-trial proceedings have expanded greatly in just the last
few years. But in no area of the law was the development quicker, more
startling, and perhaps more unexpected than the recent decisions regarding the right to counsel during pre-trial out-of-court identifications procedures and confrontations between suspects and witnesses.
Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 939 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968).
141 United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969).
142 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News at 2139.
M 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44Id.
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ceeding. 145 There has never been a reversal of this trend and
whenever doubts existed they were resolved in14 favor of enhancement of an individual's constitutional rights.

It was this judicial atmosphere that sparked Wade's inception. An understanding of this judicial trend and background
indicated that Wade was not to be given its most limited interpretation by applying it only to post-indictment line-ups. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not clearly indicate whether
Wade was to be limited to post-indictment line-ups.
Those proponents of a narrow interpretation of Wade fear
interference with police law enforcement and over protection of
the criminal. Hence several states, notably Illinois, are attempting to limit Wade to its narrowest interpretation.
Although the facts of Wade were post-indictment, the majority of the Court's opinion did not speak in the narrow and
limited terms of post-indictment. The Court's concern was with
abuses at line-ups which could readily occur before a person was
formally indicted as well as after.
It appears that a majority of the Federal Courts have not
placed a limited interpretation on Wade and have clearly indicated the illogic of requiring counsel only at post-indictment
line-ups.
Through the Omnibus Crimes Control Act, the legislative
branch of the Federal Government has been motivated to completely obliterate the effect of Wade. The constitutionality of
this act has yet to be determined. It appears that it is possible
for the Wade decision and Title II to co-exist through judicial
construction.
For the sake of preserving the important safeguard 'Wade
provides, it is desirable for Wade to be interpreted to cover all
line-ups unrestricted by Title II.
Charles R. Zisa

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
The more conservative Berger Court might at least slow down this
trend. See Harris v. New York, 39 U.S.L.W. 4281 (1971).
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